Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

8-1-2004

Two Early Codes, The Ten Commandments and the Twelve
Tables: Causes and Consequences
Alan Watson
University of Georgia School of Law, wawatson@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Alan Watson, Two Early Codes, The Ten Commandments and the Twelve Tables: Causes and
Consequences (2004),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/651

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Two Early Codes, the Ten Commandments
and the Twelve Tables: Causes and
Consequences
ALAN WATSON

That title of this talk might suggest that I will speak of two bodies of law
separately. Not entirely correct. And that I will speak of them on the same
level. False.
I
The world has known four sources of law: legislation,1 judicial precedent,
juristic opinion, custom. They do not always, or perhaps ever, exist together in
the same place at the same time.
The core of law is authority. Law must be authoritative and be authoritarian. If law is not observed, at least to some degree, it is not worthy of the
name of law.2 But then it has seemed rather strange to me in the past that a
lesson of history is that, overall, governments are little interested in legislating
much in many areas.
The lesson of history, in fact, is that over most of the field of law, and
especially of private law, in most political and economic circumstances,
political rulers need have no interest in determining what the rules of
law are or should be (provided always, of course, that revenues roll in
and that the public peace is kept). Rulers and their immediate underlings
can be, and often have been and are, indifferent to the nature of the legal
rules in operation.3
Even when great legislators like Justinian, Napoleon or Atatürk appear,
they often show little interest in giving their legislation a precise social, religious or economic slant.4 For instance, in fiercely Christian early Byzantium,
in the body of Justinian’s elementary textbook, the Institutes, and in his huge
collection of juristic rules, the Digest, Jesus is not mentioned, nor are apostles,
nor even the opinions of the Fathers of the Church. Not only that, but the
Digest of 533 scarcely contains law later than 235.5 Atatürk’s civil code for
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Turkey of 1926, Türk Kanunnu Medesini, is little more than a translation of the
old Swiss civil code. Moreover, great legislators like Justinian are at times
remarkably indifferent to communicating the substance of the law. Thus, for
first year law students his account of civil procedure in J. book 4 is largely
incomprehensible, and his great Corpus Iuris Civilis is overwhelmingly in
Latin, a language not fully comprehensible to the majority even of his educated subjects. Yet the Corpus Iuris is the most highly prized and influential
of all Western collections of legislation. Similarly, since at least the sixteenth
century and right up to today scholars have stressed the difficulty of finding the
law in English statutes.6
Law needs authority to be authoritative. For judicial precedent, juristic
opinion, custom to be law requires acquiescence in the decision by the
ruler. But there is more to the issue. Thus, ‘good’ jurists have to decide according to the reasoning approved by their fellow jurists, judges by top legal
figures. In a customary system a supposed custom has to be found. This authority has to be discovered or invented and this need is one of the main causes
of legal borrowing, no matter which sources of law are used. Likewise, the
need for authority is the cause of the continuance of much dysfunctional
law. The need for authority bends law out of shape.
Rulers are content usually to allow others to make the law. Legislation is
the sole source of law that is directly under the control of the ruler. The sole
necessary talent of rulers is to remain in power. It is this that accounts for the
general neglect of many areas of law by legislators. Most of the time most
areas of private law, and even criminal law, will be irrelevant for their survival. It is not necessary for rulers to strive to give their society the best or most
suitable law. Legislation is predominantly, if not always wholly, political.
I may mention in passing, American legislators addiction to ‘pork’. Other
means are found to develop private law.
This last statement holds true even when the law looks apolitical. A good
example is the Roman Twelve Tables of around 451/450 BC. This contains
almost entirely private law. No provision deals with public offices, and only
one concerns the state religion. That last is particularly revealing because it
is concerned with a purely secular matter: a woman who becomes a Vestal
Virgin is released from paternal power. The absence of religion becomes
especially noticeable when we compare the Twelve Tables with the Ten Commandments. When we look at the background to the Tables, the picture
becomes clear. For many years there had been a conflict between the plebeians
and the patrician elite who had a monopoly of state offices including state
priesthoods. The plebeians wanted the right to share in these offices, to be
able to know what the law was, and to be equal before the law. The patricians
agreed to a code of law provided they drafted it. In the event, the plebeians got
none of their demands. The patricians retained their monopoly of offices, the
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code contains only the private law that the patricians were willing to share
with the plebeians, and the plebeians still could not know the law because
the Twelve Tables did not contain the forms of action. No public or religious
law! The code, designed to look like a compromise or even a defeat, was a
great victory for the ruling elite.7 Their aim was to remain in control.
Another example might be Atatürk’s reform of Turkish private, commercial
and criminal law in 1926. The main incentive was purely political: the need
after World War I for a peace treaty with the victorious Allies who demanded
modernization of Turkish law.8
The Ten Commandments are beyond doubt the most celebrated collection
of laws in the Western world. They also have a very high approval rating for
their quality. Yet they are extremely peculiar. I believe it is possible to understand them better if we approach them from the general understanding of lawmaking that I have just sketched. But first I must set out some of the obstacles
to our comprehension.
There is widespread but not universal scholarly opinion that they are not
the work of Moses.9 But then there is no agreement as to the precise dating
of the laws or the historical circumstances in which they were made. Or
even if they were originally laws at all. It is by no means certain that they
were the work of one leader at one time. It can be plausibly argued that
they are a collection from various materials and were never established at
one time. If so, can one reasonably talk of a common purpose? Again, in
Exodus the account of them is immediately followed by judicial laws and
by ceremonial laws, both ostensibly given to the Israelites by God through
Moses. Should we see the Ten Commandments as one part of a trilogy?
Again a rather different version of their origin is given in Deuteronomy.
What are we to make of this?
My approach will be to assume that there were standard – more than one,
but connected – traditions about God giving laws to the Israelites. These traditions were formed into the accounts in Exodus and Deuteronomy. Those
responsible for the final version of the traditions made choices, but they
were limited in their options by the traditions themselves.
On this basis, I will treat the Ten Commandments in Exodus as a unit –
ignoring for the time being the judicial and ceremonial laws. I will not be concerned with the historical accuracy of God delivering the laws to Moses. My
concern will be with the nature of the tradition. Historical or not, the tradition
should reveal much for the understanding of the factors in law-making, not
only of the belief of the redactor, but also of the people from whom it
derived and for whom it was intended.
On this basis I wish to address some of the peculiarities of the Commandments. The relevant passages of Exodus 20 read:
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Then God spoke all these words:
I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of
the house of slavery;
you shall have no other gods before me.
You shall not make for yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything
that is in heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the
water under the earth.
You shall not bow down to them or worship them; for I the Lord your
God am a jealous God, punishing children for the iniquity of parents,
to the third and the fourth generation of those who reject me,
but showing steadfast love to the thousandth generation of those who
love me and keep my commandments.
You shall not make wrongful use of the name of the Lord your God, for
the Lord will not acquit anyone who misuses his name.
Remember the Sabbath day, and keep it holy.
Six days you shall labor and do all your work.
But the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord your God; you shall not do
any work – you, your son or your daughter, your male or female slave,
your livestock, or the alien resident in your towns.10
For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in
them, but rested the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath
day and consecrated it.
Honour your father and your mother, so that your days may be long in
the land that the Lord your God is giving you.
You shall not murder.
You shall not commit adultery.
You shall not steal.
You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.
You shall not covet your neighbour’s house; you shall not covet your
neighbour’s wife, or male or female slave, or ox, or donkey, or anything
that belongs to your neighbour.11

A first peculiarity to notice is that the provisions are remarkably nonthreatening. A glance at other ancient codes or laws will show the difference.
Thus, the first section of the Code (or Laws) of Hammurabi (of, at the latest,
the early seventeenth century BC) reads: ‘If a man has made allegations
against another man, and he has laid a charge of homicide against him but
is unable to substantiate his guilt, the one who made the allegations against
him shall be killed.’12 In contrast, penalties are noticeably absent from the
Ten Commandments. Mention of punishment occurs only in three, two of
them among the religious rules, and they are non-specific. Thus, for bowing
down to other gods, God will punish the children for the offence of their
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parents down to the fourth generation (20.6). The precise punishment,
however horrible it might be, is not expressed. For wrongly using the name
of God He will not acquit (20.7). The remaining mention of punishment scarcely deserves that name: you should honour your parents ‘so that your days
may be long in the land that God is giving you’ (20.12).
The provision on honouring parents might be regarded as transitional.
The rule of human kindness is interpersonal, but the ‘penalty’ involves
God. It might be suggested, moreover, that this ‘penalty’ is a much later
addition: as such it does not appear in the corresponding text of Deuteronomy 5:16: ‘Honour your father and your mother, as the Lord your God
commanded you, so that your days may be long and that it may go well
with you in the land that the Lord your God is giving you.’
Again the Commandments are split into two very distinctive parts:
behaviour towards God, behaviour towards other humans. And the parts are
distinctly unequal. Duties towards God are much more prominent. It is not
just that these rules come first. They are much more detailed. For example,
prohibitions against work on the Sabbath are spelled out to apply not only
to the male head of the family, but also to his sons, daughters, male slaves,
female slaves, even his animals and visitors. In contrast, for inter-human
law we have, for instance, simply ‘you shall not kill’. There is a translation
difficulty: ‘kill’ or ‘murder’?13 No matter for the moment. Not only is the
penalty not set out, but the offence is not defined or described. Yet the
offence cries out for clarification.
But there is much more. The rules about behaviour to other humans are
socially necessary but banal in the extreme: no murder, no theft, no adultery,
no false witness. Why did God bother with these? Why was He needed? Not
even the penalty is spelled out.
Then the two interpersonal commands that are not just framed ‘You shall
not——’ are framed in a more complex manner. Thus, a reason for honouring
father and mother is given, and it scarcely seems to have a legal content.14 It is
also expressed more directly: ‘Honour——’. The last command, ‘You shall
not covet——’, concerns mental activity, not physical action, and can scarcely
give rise to a lawsuit. And there is a third peculiarity in the tradition – though
this time not in the substance of the Commandments – in the role of Aaron.
And Aaron’s role is pivotal.
These peculiarities in the tradition must be explained and, for me, the
explanation must lie within the tradition itself.
[I am well aware that some readers will reject this paper as giving too
few references to standard scholarship. I understand. But my concerns are
not with the precise meaning of individual provisions, nor with the historical
provenance of our accounts in Exodus and Deuteronomy, nor even with
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Deuteronomy. All I set out to do is to understand the tradition in Exodus in the
context of the place of legislation in the history of legal development].15
Legislation is a very particular form of law-making – the only source of
law that rulers keep under their direct control. And the only necessary talent
of rulers is to remain in power. Moses is a leader in trouble. Indeed, for
him, one problem follows another. It was God who appointed Moses as the
Israelites’ leader, and who performed miracle after miracle to keep Moses
in power. Defeat for Moses would be defeat for God. And Moses always
had a prospective rival in the wings, his elder brother Aaron. Aaron is prominent in Moses’ leadership from the very beginning, and is also a leading figure
in the Israelites’ rebellion against God, in the making of the golden calf. Just
before God gave the Commandments to Moses his sympathetic father-in-law
told Moses he was wearing himself out in deciding lawsuits. Moses has to
keep his authority and God’s authority. Legislation is his solution. God is
Moses’ authority, and the legislation must stress God’s authority for the Israelites. The control of legal relations between humans is of little concern. These
can be dealt with by lower officials.
Moses murdered an Egyptian and fled to Midian (2.11 ff.). God appeared
to Moses and told him He would send him to Pharaoh to deliver the Israelites
from bondage (3.7 f.). Moses protested, but God insisted (3.11 ff.). God
emphasized that the Egyptian king would not let them go, but that He
would smite the Egyptians, and the Israelites would be allowed to leave
(3.19 ff.). Moses continued to protest and God showed him miracles (4.1
ff.). Moses continued to protest, claiming that he lacked eloquence (4.10
ff.). God was angered and replied that his brother Aaron (who was coming
to meet Moses) had fluency and would act as his mouthpiece (4.14 ff.). ‘He
indeed shall speak for you to the people: he shall serve as a mouth for you,
and you shall serve as God for him’ (4.17).16 Moses left for Egypt with his
wife and sons (4.18 ff.). God told Aaron to meet Moses, and Moses told
Aaron of God’s miracles and what He had said (4.27 f.). Moses and Aaron
assembled the Israelite elders (4.29). ‘Aaron spoke all the words that the
Lord had spoken to Moses, and performed the signs in the sight of the
people’ (4.30). The people believed (4.31). Moses and Aaron went to
Pharaoh and told him God wanted them to celebrate a festival in the wilderness (5.1 ff.). But Pharaoh answered: ‘Moses and Aaron, why are you
taking the people away from their work? Get to your labours’ (5.5). Note
that Moses and Aaron are treated as equals before Pharaoh. Pharaoh increased
the workload of the Israelites who blamed Moses and Aaron (5.20 ff.). God
spoke to Moses, promising freedom (6.1 ff.). ‘Moses told this to the Israelites:
but they would not listen to Moses, because of their broken spirit and their
cruel slavery’ (6.9). God told Moses to tell Pharaoh to let the people go, but
Moses protested that Pharaoh would not listen because he was a poor
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speaker (6.10 ff.). God then gave Moses and Aaron His orders (6.13). We are
again told that God ordered Moses and Aaron to bring the people out of Egypt
(6.26), and they spoke again to Pharaoh (6.27). God spoke again to Moses who
again protested he was a poor speaker, and that Pharaoh would not listen. God
said ‘See I have made you like God to Pharaoh, and your brother Aaron shall
be your prophet. You shall speak all that I command you, and your brother
Aaron shall tell Pharaoh to let the Israelites go out of his land’ (7.1 f ). Then
comes the biblical treatment of the ten plagues inflicted upon Pharaoh by
God for failing to let the Israelites leave (7.14 –12.32).
The chapters reveal a fascinating dichotomy. God speaks primarily to
Moses, with Aaron very much Moses’ helpmeet. Yet Moses’ weakness is
stressed. In contrast, in their interaction with Pharaoh Moses and Aaron
appear very much on the same level. If we can assume, as I believe is reasonable, that when Moses and Aaron were before Pharaoh and his officials
members of the Israelite elite were also present or at least knew of the
meeting, and Aaron would be regarded by them as very close to being
Moses’ equal.
But a side issue then arises. If God can work so many miracles, why does
He leave Moses with such a defect that he needs Aaron’s constant help? The
issue, I think, is significant.
While the Israelites were still in Egypt, God gave Moses and Aaron
instructions for the first Passover (12.1 ff.), but it is Moses who communicated
them to the Israelites (12.21 ff.). Yet again, God gave Passover instructions to
both Moses and Aaron (12.43 ff.). And the people followed their instructions
(12.50). God told Moses to consecrate all the firstborn to Him (13.1 f) and
Moses did so. In these fundamental legal matters Moses is basically his
own spokesman.
God told Moses to camp before the Red Sea (14.1 ff.); Pharaoh prepared to
attack (14.5 ff.), and the people blamed Moses vehemently for what seemed an
approaching disaster (14.11 ff.), but, through the agency of Moses, God
destroyed the Egyptians (14.15 ff.). The miracle of the Red (or Reed) Sea is
the climax of the Exodus, and Aaron is not mentioned. 14.31 records ‘So
the people feared the Lord and believed in the Lord and in his servant
Moses’. According to the tradition in the Passover Haggadah (section ‘The
Plagues’), the number of plagues inflicted on the Egyptians at the sea was
vastly greater than the ten plagues in Egypt.
Later at Marah the water was bitter and could not be drunk and the people
blamed Moses (15.23 ff.). In the wilderness the Israelites complained against
both Moses and Aaron (16.1 ff.) And God told Moses he would rain manna
from Heaven (16.4), and Moses and Aaron gave instructions to the people
(16.6 ff.). Moses then told Aaron to say to the people: ‘Draw near to the
Lord’ (16.9). Moses gave further instructions to the people about manna,
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but not all of them obeyed (16.5 ff.). Further on, again the people disobeyed
(16.27 ff.). God told Moses that some manna should be placed before the covenant for ever, and Moses so instructed Aaron (16.31 ff.). The people quarrelled
with Moses because they had no water, and Moses told God that the people
were almost ready to stone him. God told Moses to strike a rock with his
staff and water came forth (17.1 ff.). God enabled Moses, with the help of
Aaron and Hur, to defeat Amalek (17.8 ff.).
Again a clear pattern emerges. God had chosen Moses to be the leader of
the Israelites. For God, Aaron is definitely Moses’ subordinate, and Aaron
acted as Moses’ intermediary with the people. Time and again God saved
the Israelites in distress with a miracle performed through Moses. Yet time
and again, when the people were in distress they quarrelled with Moses.
Despite his authority from God, Moses did not have the confidence of his
people. His control was shaky.
Perhaps more immediately in the present context, Moses was wearing
himself out with hearing lawsuits all day long. His father-in-law had come
for a visit, saw Moses judging all day, wearing himself out (18.13), and he
advised him to teach the people the statutes and instructions. He also
advised that Moses should appoint judges to hear minor cases, but should
hear major cases himself. Moses agreed. He summoned the people and they
agreed to do whatever God said (19.7). Shortly thereafter, God delivered
the Ten Commandments. Thus, a leader in trouble received authoritative
legislation.
I need not record the steps by which God ensured that only Moses would
see Him and speak with Him (19.9 ff.). Nor is it important to discuss the laws
that God subsequently gave orally to Moses (20.22 – 40.38). Whether they
come from a different time in history need not concern us. But three points
about them should be mentioned:
First, the rules on behaviour between humans do not confirm the widely
held view that the Ten Commandments cover all the law in short
compass.17 The Commandments contain nothing about slavery, violence
less than murder, the law of torts and restitution; all these are matters
treated in the Book of the Covenant. These rules in the Book of the Covenant
again indicate the lack of interest in ‘secular’ law in the Commandments.
Second, the rules on religious ceremonial matters are very much more
detailed than those on interpersonal law. Again the authority of God and the
importance of reverence towards Him are stressed. They are of supreme
importance to Moses as leader.
Third, much is made of Aaron and his sons being appointed priests, their
vestments, the ephod, and of a splendid breastplate for Aaron, other priestly
vestments for the sons and their ordination, their tending of the lamp
(27.20 –29.46). God, or Moses, needs to keep Aaron loyal to the service of
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God, and hence to Moses. (It may be worth noting that rabbinic tradition
emphasizes that Moses and Aaron were of equal worth).18
A little more should be said about the distinction made between the Ten
Commandments and the judicial and ceremonial laws which existed – as
Philo shows – as early as the time of Jesus. The Ten Commandments, it is
claimed, were addressed to all, the other laws only to the Jews. Not so. The
Ten Commandments are expressly addressed to the Jews. Exodus 20.2
reads: ‘I am the Lord your God who brought you of out the land of Egypt’.
A further distinction often drawn is that God gave the Ten Commandments
directly, the other laws were mediated through Moses. This distinction
seems arbitrary. The real difference seems to me that the ceremonial and judicial laws could never be acceptable outside of a small Jewish section.
When Moses descended from Mount Sinai the worst had happened (32.1
ff.). The Israelites had made a golden calf, a new god, who was asserted to
have brought them out of Egypt (32.4). Thus, God was denied, and so was
Moses’ authority. Aaron is not reported to be the ringleader of the revolt,
but only as much involved from the start. The people said to Aaron: ‘Come,
make gods for us, who shall go before us’ (32.1). Aaron’s reported response
was: ‘Take off the gold rings that are on the ears of your wives, your sons,
and your daughters, and bring them to me’ (32.2). Aaron actually made the
calf-god (32.4) and instituted a festival for it (32.5 f).
At this point I would like to respond to a friendly criticism from a Christian
fundamentalist who believes God did give the Ten Commandments to Moses.
He says with respect to the final Commandment: ‘God, but not man, would care
about coveting’.19 I disagree. Moses, a leader in trouble, has supreme interest
in coveting. His job! It is at risk. The subsequent behaviour of Aaron is revealing. Aaron has not yet made his move, but he will. No one should underestimate the vigour with which political figures protect their jobs. I can
understand that God might oppose coveting but I see no compelling reason
for Him to legislate. But in the tradition Moses has a strong positive interest.
Another point should be made. The prohibition against coveting makes
superfluous the rules against stealing and adultery. Both involve coveting.20
My conclusions about the history of the tradition behind the Ten Commandments in Exodus are as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Of the four sources of law only legislation is under the direct control of
governments.
The lesson of history is that in general most governments at most times
are little interested in legislating in many areas of law.
The sole necessary talent of governments and rulers is remaining in
power. Hence the paucity of legislation in many areas of law. Rulers
have better things to do (for themselves) with their time.
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(4)

Legislation is accordingly always or usually political: its raison d’être
is to keep the government in power.
According to the tradition of Exodus, the Ten Commandments are no
exception.
Moses became leader of the Israelites, who were under the subjugation
of the Egyptians, on the basis that he was elected by God. Moses, we
are told, was reluctant to accept the office, because of his lack of
fluency in speech, but God insisted and appointed Moses’ brother
Aaron to be his helpmeet.
Moses’ authority before the people was based precisely on the belief
that he was the elect of God.
Through miracles of God Moses did obtain the Israelites’ release from
slavery in Egypt.
Moses’ authority continued to rest on his unique position from God.
Whereas God kept Aaron in a clearly subordinate position, Aaron’s
status among the Israelites seems, in contrast, almost like that of Moses.
When great hardships befell the Israelites during the Exodus they continually blamed Moses for their plight. This inevitably entails a diminution of faith in or respect for God on whose authority Moses’ power
depended. Aaron was less criticized. Despite God’s miracles the Israelites repeatedly showed a lack of confidence in Moses’ leadership, and
hence in God. Moses’ authority was under siege. Hence, he could not
afford to seem too threatening.
Moses was under great strain not only from this but also because he
was spending his days in judging. A solution was proposed by his
father-in-law, significantly not an Israelite but a Midianite.
God intervened, and provided laws for the Israelites but under specific
circumstances: (a) the people were told that God would legislate with
no input from the people, (b) the laws were given directly by God to
Moses, but to no one else, (c) indeed, God was to be absolutely
hidden to others.
As is to be expected, if my first four conclusions are correct, the laws of
God very much bolstered the authority of Moses. The stress is precisely
on religious laws, hence on the authority of God, hence on the authority
of Moses. Laws with a secular impact were little considered. This is
why they are banal.
The people were still not impressed by Moses’ leadership and during
his absence on Mount Sinai they worshipped as god a golden calf,
thus attacking God’s first Commandment (which they still did not
have), hence God’s authority and thus Moses’ authority.
If not the instigator, Aaron, the second in command, was prominent in
the revolt, even suggesting where to obtain the material for the calf and

(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)
(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)
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making it. As often, the second-in-command is eager for the leading
role. In Exodus the talent of Aaron is presented above all as the
power of persuasion. Given that fact, it seems plausible that at one
stage in the tradition (now unrecorded) Aaron appeared as the instigator
of the revolt. As often in history, then, Moses would have co-opted
Aaron, and used him against his followers.
Thus God had been eager to encourage or placate Aaron by giving
favours. In vain. (Aaron’s resentment against Moses is brought up
very sharply in Numbers 12. It is part of the tradition. God weighs in
in favour of Moses.)
Moses ultimately triumphed through the power of God. Aaron easily
submitted to him.
The role of Aaron is essential to the tradition. Moses must have weaknesses for the story to unfold. He must have a helpmeet. Moses must
have great problems with the people, and the people must have an
alternative power-figure. For the authority of God fully to emerge
this figure must in the end fail miserably.

I will not dwell here on the subsequent history of the Ten Commandments ripped out of context. It is enough to note that ‘Honour your father
and mother’ survives in the French code civil of 1804, art. 371, though it
has almost never been applied, and the reason given for it has disappeared.
The debate over the placing of the Commandments in US court houses continues to this day.
II
To come at last to the Roman Twelve Tables. I have already given a sketch
of how they came into being. Here I want to deal only with one institution
of the code, mancipatio, which existed long before but which is dealt with
in Tab. 7.6 ff. dealing with praedial servitudes; Tab. 5.3 dealing with succession; Tab. 4.26 dealing with the sale of a son.
I have two points to make. The ingenuity of jurists in developing law in the
absence of further legislation. And the difficulty of outsiders in grasping what
was going on. The consequences of starting points are enormous and unforeseen. The example I have chosen is mancipatio. Its form for the classical
period is described by Gaius in his Institutes, 1.119:
Now mancipatio is, as we said above, a sort of imaginary sale, and it,
too, is peculiar to Roman citizens. It is performed thus: not fewer than
five witnesses who are Roman citizens above puberty plus one other
who holds a bronze scale and is called a libripens, are summoned and
brought together, and the person who takes by the mancipatio,
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holding the bronze, speaks thus: ‘I declare this man is mine by the law of
the citizens, and let him have been bought by me by this bronze and this
bronze scale’. Then he strikes the scale with the bronze and gives the
bronze, as if in the place of the price, to the person from whom he is
receiving in mancipatio.
In G.1.121, Gaius tells us that the object to be mancipated must be present,
unless it is land, which is regularly mancipated at a distance. The ceremony,
whose antiquity is well attested, obviously derives from an actual sale before
the time of coined money, when copper or bronze as the price was actually
weighed on the scale. Which things were res mancipi in Gaius’ time are
explained by him in G.2.14a –17:
14a. There is also another division of things: for they are either res
mancipi or res nec mancipi. Res mancipi are land and houses on Italic
soil, likewise slaves and those animals that are usually broken to draft
or burden, such as cattle, horses, mules, and asses: likewise rustic praedial servitudes. For urban praedial servitudes are nec mancipi. Nec
mancipi are also stipendiary or tributary lands. 15. A question is
raised as to the meaning of our statement that those animals that are
usually broken in are res mancipi, because they are not broken in at
the time of birth. And the leaders of our school think they are res
mancipi as soon as they are born. But Nerva and Proculus and other
leaders of the other school hold that they do not become res mancipi
unless they are broken in and if, because of too much wildness, they
cannot be broken in then they come to be res mancipi when they
reach the age at which they usually are broken in. 16. Likewise wild
beasts are res nec mancipi, such as bears, lions, likewise these
animals which are almost in the category of wild animals, such as elephants and camels; and it does not matter that these animals too are
broken in to draft or burden, for their very names did not exist in the
time when it was settled which things were res mancipi and res nec
mancipi. 17. Also, nec mancipi are almost all incorporeal things, with
the exception of rustic praedial servitudes, which, it is settled, are
mancipi although they are in the category of incorporeal things.
Three peculiarities in the list may help to establish the original list of res
mancipi and explain the classification. First is the dispute between the Sabinians and the Proculians over cattle, horses, mules and asses, the Sabinians
including all such, the Proculians only those broken in or of the age at
which they were usually broken in. Second is the inclusion of land, which
is thought not to fit particularly well into the ceremony, since it involves a
grasping by the hand.21 Third is the inclusion of rustic praedial servitudes,
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which were incorporeal rights and did not involve (in classical law at least) the
legal right of ownership. A fourth peculiarity – much discussed by scholars –
is less obvious at first sight: the inclusion of horses may be odd, since unlike
the other animals classified as res mancipi, horses were not much used for
agricultural work.22 Until the invention much later of the horse collar,
horses had little pulling power. A further, revealing, point appears incidentally. Gaius shows that the classification has no surviving rational value. Elephants and camels are not res mancipi, not because they lack the
characteristics of the objects of that class, but because they were not known
when the classification became fixed. Gaius betrays no disquiet at this lack
of fit. This is in the tradition of legal development.
The remote origins of the classification probably cannot be determined. It
may be that originally there was no rigid distinction between res mancipi and
other things: there was only the feeling that, for greater security, important
things should be transferred before witnesses. What these things were gradually became fixed, as did the details of the required ceremony. An alternative
thesis might be that some things were conceived of as being more ‘family’
property than other things23 and were at first inalienable or (both at first and
later) alienable only publicly. In either eventuality, slaves, horses, cattle,
asses and mules are an obvious unit. Greater precision is not needed here.
Italic land is also classified as res mancipi along with these animate beings,
though it is (to us) obviously different in nature. Whether or not it was always
so classified – perhaps, not, if, as is sometimes claimed, land in early times
was not in private ownership – cannot, I think, be established, but the application to it of the ceremony of mancipatio is our first glimpse of pragmatism in
this context. Mancipatio, as a ceremony, involved in its developed form a
grasping in the hand that is not entirely appropriate for land. One may conclude either that land was added to the list of res mancipi after the form of
the ceremony was fixed, or that as the class of res mancipi emerged and as
the details of the form of transfer were recognized as necessary, one ceremony
alone became acceptable for the transfer of all res mancipi, though it was not
always wholly appropriate. In either case, it was opportunistic either to classify land as res mancipi or to treat mancipatio as appropriate to it.
But a much more flagrant case of opportunism appears in the classification
of rustic praedial servitudes as res mancipi. 24 The four original praedial servitudes were iter, a right of passage, actus, a right of driving beasts, via, a right
of having a ‘paved’ road, and aquae ductus, a right of aqueduct. These servitudes or easements are of extreme economic importance in a primitive agricultural community. Farming neighbours will obviously want to make use of
them, and they will come into existence in practice by consent, even
without legal recognition. But nonetheless the need for legal protection will
soon be felt. How are neighbours to create such rights? Some form will be
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needed. In the absence of official intervention, recourse could be had to the
ceremony of mancipatio. 25 Traditio (delivery), the standard method of
conveying res nec mancipi, could not be used, not just because of its informality but also because it required physical delivery of the thing to be transferred.26 There is no alternative to mancipatio. And eventually the courts
will recognize that servitudes have been created. A purely pragmatic solution
was found. But, as a consequence, praedial servitudes, though incorporeal
rights, were classified as res mancipi.
Failure to appreciate Roman legal pragmatism has led scholars to hold that
the early Romans and their successors for a long time conceived of servitudes
as corporeal objects, and that the holder of the servitude right had ownership
of the corresponding strip of land, or alternatively that ownership of the strip
of land was functionally divided between the owner of the land and the neighbour in right of the servitude.27 Diósdi has given the conclusive arguments
against such views by analyzing two provisions of the Twelve Tables. One
provides that the owner of the land must lay a road, via, with stones (or, alternatively, set curbstones), and if he does not, the other may drive his beast
wherever he wants.28 As Diósdi says, if the person entitled to passage
had become the owner of the strip of land, the owner of the servient land
would be under no obligation to pave it, nor if the owner failed to do so,
would the other be able to lead his beast where he wished.29 The other provision is even more to the point and declares that the breadth of the via
should be eight feet on the straight, sixteen feet on the bends.30 This provision,
as Diósdi claims, would have been superfluous if via gave ownership, since the
transfer itself would then define the territory.31 It should be stressed that it is
the fact that mancipatio is used to create servitudes that has led modern scholars to claim that servitudes were considered by the early Romans to be corporeal things. Strong is the belief that law is rational.
Mancipatio, with a variant wording for the nature of the taking – akin to
fide et fiduciae (‘to my faith and trust’) – was used to create real security of res
mancipi. 32 The creditor accepted ownership of the pledged property, and,
since as owner his security was great, he could allow the debtor to continue
to possess and use the pledged property. The usage was a benefit to both.
But the Romans came to use the ceremony of mancipatio very creatively
well outside the realm of the transfer of res mancipi. One variation was to
permit in early law the making of a will, the so-called testamentum per aes
et libram. This is described by the jurist Gaius in the mid-second century
ad, in his Institutes 2.104:
The proceedings are as follows: the person making the will, as in other
mancipations, takes five Roman citizens above puberty as witnesses and
a balance-holder and, after having written his will, mancipates his
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familia [i.e., his property considered as a unit]. In the mancipatio, the
recipient of the familia uses these words: ‘I declare your familia and
your property to be subject to your instructions under my guardianship
so that you may lawfully make a will according to the public statute, and
let it have been bought by me with this bronze (and some add) with this
bronze scale’. Then he strikes the balance with the bronze and gives the
bronze to the testator as if in lieu of the price. Then the testator, holding
the tablets of the will, says: ‘As it is written on these tablets and in this
will, so I give, so I legate, so I call to witness, and so, citizens, do you
bear me witness’. This is called nuncupatio, nuncupare meaning to
declare publicly. And by these general words the testator is thought to
declare and confirm what he had specifically written in the tablets of
the will.
By the second century BC (and indeed, long before), this testamentum per
aes et libram, as it is called, had become a proper will in which an heir
could be appointed. This was not the original position. In early Rome
before the Twelve Tables, a will could be made publicly before the assembly
known as the comitia calata, which met twice a year, on 24 March and 24
May, for the purpose of making wills. This was obviously very inconvenient,
and the practice grew up of making testamentary dispositions by using a modified form of mancipatio. This practice was confirmed by the Twelve Tables in
a provision (Tab. 5.3) that apparently read something like: Uti legassit super
pecunia tutelave suae rei, ita ius esto 34 (‘As he made a legacy over his property [pecunia] and the guardianship of goods, so let the law be’). The provision talks of legating, not of appointing an heir; the word pecunia
(property) does not have, as familia has, the implication of property treated
as a unit, and it would thus seem that at that time this type of testamentary disposition did not extend, as it did later, to the appointment of the heir entitled to
the estate.35
Although no heir could thus be appointed at the time of the Twelve
Tables, this is, nonetheless, a very creative use of mancipatio. This variant
mancipatio could be used to appoint a tutor under the will, a result very different from transferring res mancipi, and to transfer res nec mancipi. The variant
shows that the wording of mancipatio was not absolutely fixed and that no
real weighing out of copper had to be involved. There is no evidence that
the familiae emptor ever acquired any rights or duties as a result of the ceremony,36 and the legatee became the owner automatically on the testator’s
death. Thus the ceremony did not immediately transfer even res mancipi at
the moment it was performed. This use seems to have been the result of
private initiative, hence the clause confirming its legal effectiveness in the
Twelve Tables.
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But scholars seem to have difficulty in accepting the opportunism involved
in this kind of development. Max Kaser talks in terms of a divided ownership
between the testator and the familiae emptor and subsequently between the
familiae emptor and the legatees.37 None of this is justified by the sources,
and such an explanation is needed only if one takes a formalistic attitude to
legal development.
A further use of mancipatio was in marriage (G.1.113): ‘By coemptio
women come into manus (matrimonial power) by mancipatio, that is by a
sort of imaginary sale; thus, in the presence of not fewer than five Roman
citizen witnesses above puberty, he into whose manus she comes, buys the
woman’.38 In early Rome, marriage was either cum manu or sine manu. The
former put the wife into the family and under the power of the husband, or of
his paterfamilias if he had one. The latter left her in her family, or in her own
control, sui iuris. Coemptio was one of the major ways of putting the wife into
the manus of her husband, and it existed from an early date. Whether coemptio
originally was a true sale cannot be established. Certainly one can draw no
argument from the fact that the ceremony involved the appearance of a sale,
since a similar procedure operated for adoption, which certainly did not
involve sale and purchase. In all probability, coemptio was a device to
extend marriage cum manu to segments of the population that could not
make use of confarreatio for that purpose, since the latter required the presence of some of Rome’s highest religious dignitaries and hence was very
much confined to the most powerful families.
One easily overlooked detail in coemptio is instructive regarding Roman
legal opportunism. There is no indication that coemptio was restricted to situations in which a woman had a paterfamilias, and it would be very surprising
if it were. But if the woman were sui iuris, there would be no one to whom the
familiae emptor could give the bronze. She would be in the manus of her
husband and all her property would belong to him, so she could not be the recipient of the bronze. The innovative Romans were unlikely to have wasted time
on such an unimportant technicality.
Closely allied to mancipatio, probably in fact a version of it and certainly
an act per aes et libram, was nexum, by which a free man was bound to a
creditor and was subject to his control until an amount of bronze that had
been paid out was repaid.39 Nexum was regulated by the Twelve Tables
(Tab. 6.1), and probably in this context also belongs the provision (Tab.
4.2b): Si pater filium ter venum duit, filius a patre liber esto (‘If a father
sells his son three times, let the son be free from the father’).40 If a son
was mancipated – that is, given in nexum – three times by his father to
work off a debt (or until a loan was repaid), the son would become free
from paternal power. This clause came to be used pragmatically to
achieve two very different ends. The first was to free a son from paternal
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power (emancipatio) while his father was still alive and thus make the son a
pater in his turn. This had numerous advantages for the son, above all in that
only a person sui iuris not subject to another’s power could own property.
G.1.132: Moreover, children cease to be in paternal power by emancipatio. But a son passes out from paternal power by three mancipations,
other descendants whether male or female by one mancipation. For
the Twelve Tables speak of three mancipations in the case of the son
alone, in these words: ‘If a father sells his son three times, let the son
be free from the father.’ This is the procedure: the father mancipates
the son to someone; this last manumits the son vindicta; on that
account the son reverts into the potestas of the father. He mancipates
him a second time either to the same or another person (but it is customary to mancipate him to the same person), and he afterward similarly
manumits him vindicta again; and thereby he reverts again into the
potestas of the father. The father mancipates him a third time either to
the same or another person (but it is customary to mancipate him to
the same person) and by this mancipatio he ceases to be in the power
of the pater even though he has not yet been manumitted but is in the
position of a mancipium.
But, of course, the person who received him by mancipatio for the third
time would manumit the former son, who now became a paterfamilias in
his own right. The interpretation of the Twelve Tables’ provision as being
restricted to sons, so that other descendants would be free from paternal
power after one mancipation, is a minor example of opportunism intended
to simplify the procedure.
The second pragmatic use of the Twelve Tables’ clause was to permit
adoption of a person who was in patria potestas.
G.1.134: Further, fathers cease to have in their potestas those children
whom they gave to others in adoption. In the case of a son, if he is
given in adoption, three mancipations and two intervening manumissions are used, and they are accomplished in the same way as when a
father is releasing him from potestas in order to make him sui iuris.
Then either he is remancipated to the father and it is from the father
that the adopter claims him as his son in front of the praetor, who,
with the father making no counterclaim, adjudges the son to the claimant; or he is not remancipated to the father but the adopter claims
him from the person with whom he is under the third mancipation.
But remancipation to the father is more convenient. For other descendants whether of the male or female sex one mancipation is enough
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and either they are or are not remancipated to the father. In the provinces
the same proceedings are used before the governor of the province.
We still have not finished with the opportunistic use made by the Romans
of the simple ceremony of mancipatio. One further example may be adduced.
Throughout the classical period,41 a Roman woman who was sui iuris was
subject to perpetual tutelage and required the authority of her tutor for
various acts. But if she wished a more complaisant tutor, she could, as
Gaius tells us (G.1.115), give herself in coemptio with the consent of her
tutor, not for the purpose of marriage. The recipient would remancipate her
to the person of her choice, whereupon, after being manumitted vindicta by
him, she would come by matter of law under his tutelage. Until the time of
Hadrian, this procedure had a particular advantage, since a woman who had
not undergone capitis deminutio, or change of civil status, could not make a
will.42
G.1.115a: Formerly, too, fiduciary coemptio was used for the purpose of
making a will. For at that time women, with certain exceptions, did not
have the right of making wills, unless they had made coemptio and had
been remancipated and manumitted. But the senate on the authority of
the deified Hadrian remitted the need of making a coemptio.
The uses made of mancipatio represent a splendid success story for legal
opportunism. From being a formal, immediate conveyance of certain kinds of
things, mancipatio became a way to create and transfer easements, to form a
real security, to put a wife into the marital power (manus) of her husband, to
adopt, to free a person from paternal power, to make a will under which even a
tutor could be appointed, and enable a woman to change her status, with the
effect, inter alia, that she could make a will. But such juristic ingenuity
needed official acceptance to be successful. Indeed, for some of the situations
involved – notably adoption, emancipation and the change of a woman’s
status – active state participation was required.
Opportunism by jurists can go a considerable way at times towards alleviating defects in official lawmaking. But it also pinpoints a failure by the
state authorities to create the law that is wanted. Successful juristic opportunism with economy of means can only proceed out of such a failure. In
addition, such successful opportunism shows a readiness on the part of the
state authorities to allow others, private individuals at that, to make a considerable part of the private law. Yet the opportunistic uses of mancipatio have profound social and economic effects. The creation of legally recognized rustic
praedial servitudes allows land to be used much more efficiently; fiducia
has numerous agricultural and commercial advantages; coemptio greatly
widens the social range of husbands who have wives in their power; adoption
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allows families that would otherwise become extinct to continue; emancipation greatly increases the number of persons who can own property; the
(more or less) free power of testation is of great consequence for families
and dynasties, and so even more is the power of testation accorded to women.
The history of mancipatio does not stand alone.
III
We have looked at two very different ancient bodies of law. Both are representative instances of massive legislation. They are both the result of intensive
political pressure, and they reflect this temporary pressure. The leaders are
in trouble and they act to remain in power. Moses rules through the authority
of God. The Ten Commandments are given by God to Moses. The stress is on
the relationship between God and man; laws on inter-human behaviour are
banal and insufficient. It might be said the laws in their stress reflect the
society but it should be noted that the authority of God was not that secure.
The episode of Aaron and the Golden Calf shows that. In contrast, the
Roman Twelve Tables are outstandingly secular. No wonder! The plebeians
demanded legal equality with the ruling patricians. After years of conflict
the patricians agreed to a code of giving equality before the law. They insisted
on drafting it. And the code is remarkably egalitarian but it omits all public
law and all religious law. The patricians retained all political and priestly
offices. The Roman were regarded and regarded themselves as the most religious people, but this does not appear from the Twelve Tables.
Law is mysterious. The causes of legislation and of the parameters of
change are not obvious even at the time, and result in gross misunderstanding
especially by outsiders in the future. Rules take on a life of their own. No one
could have predicted when the rules were issued the impact of the Ten Commandments in the contemporary USA. For the Twelve Tables I stressed a
rather different issue, the remarkable expansion of mancipatio which
existed even before. Outsiders often fail to take account of legal inventiveness
leading to a belief that Romans treated easements as corporeal property and
that marriage by coemptio was a real sale of the woman to her husband.
A further consequence of the history behind the code was that the later
jurists were interested almost solely in private law, in interpretation but not
in systematization and scarcely in law reform.43
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